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Abstract
Government expenditure shocks increase output and do not decrease consumption. We
argue this is due to the behavior of the central bank. A basic RBC model is able to deliver
this result as long as the central bank behaves as the empirical evidence suggests.
JEL Classi￿cation: E2; E3
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1 Introduction
The recent evidence suggests that either consumption is unchanged or rises in response to an
unanticipated increase in government spending. There is no evidence in the literature of a signi-
￿cative negative consumption response. Most of the evidence is obtained from structural vector
autoregressive (VAR) models, with di⁄erent papers using one of two basic di⁄erent identi￿cation
techniques. Blanchard and Perotti (2002), FatÆs and Mihov (2001) and Gali et al (2004) identify
exogenous shocks to government spending by assuming that this variable is predetermined with
respect to the other variables. They ￿nd that private consumption rises signi￿cantly and per-
sistently after an unanticipated increase in government purchases. In the same methodological
vein, Perotti (2004) ￿nds that this result is pretty robust to a sample of ￿ve OECD countries.
Mountford and Uhlig (2002) identify the policy shocks using sign and near-zero restrictions on
the impulse response functions and obtain that government expenditure shocks stimulate the
economy but do not change private consumption. Perotti (1999) studies the comovement of con-
sumption and government spending and ￿nds out that only during ￿scal consolidation episodes,
characterized by large spending cuts, private consumption and output rise, but in all other ex-
periences the opposite happens, private consumption moves together with government spending.
Others, like Edelberg, Eichenbaum and Fisher (1999), and Burnside, Eichenbaum and Fisher
(2003) use additional information such as timing of wars to identify the ￿scal policy shock. They
￿The views expressed in this paper are of the authors and do not necessarily those of Banco de Portugal. We
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1consider three military build-up episodes in the US as their exogenous government expenditure
shocks.1 Within this approach, the dynamic e⁄ects of the government spending shock are traced
as the responses to innovations in the dummies corresponding to each of the three episodes. This
alternative methodology leads to the conclusion that the ￿scal policy has no noticeable impact
on private consumption. Edelberg, Eichenbaum and Fisher (1999) ￿nds a small and delayed
fall in the consumption of nondurables and services, though durables consumption increases on
impact. Burnside, Eichenbaum and Fisher (2003) ￿nd a ￿ at response of aggregate consumption
in the short run, followed by a small (and insigni￿cant) rise in that variable several quarters
after the shock.
Thus, the evidence appears not to support a strong negative comovement between private
consumption and government expenditure, except for the large movements in government ex-
penditure like ￿scal consolidation episodes or wars. Although consistent with the Keynesian
multiplier theory, this result stands in stark contrast with the prediction of the standard real
business cycle (RBC) model. That is because in the standard RBC model an increase in gov-
ernment expenditure raises the present value of the stream of taxes over time which generates a
negative wealth e⁄ect that brings down consumption. This prediction of the RBC model is de-
scribed in Christiano and Eichenbaum (1992) and Baxter and King (1993), among others. This
contradiction led researchers to search for features that could be introduced in a RBC model in
order to account for the empirical ￿nding that consumption responds positively to ￿scal spend-
ing shocks. Linnemann and Schabert (2003) consider a sticky price model where government
expenditures provide utility to households. Private consumption is crowded in by a positive
government expenditures shock as long as the elasticity of substitution between the private and
the public good is su¢ ciently small. Devereux, Head and Lapham (1996) have a production
function of the ￿nal good with constant returns on the quantity employed of intermediate goods
but increasing returns to an expansion of variety holding constant the quantity employed of each
intermediate good. An increase in government spending will create an opportunity for pro￿ts,
inducing more ￿rms to enter which will increase the variety of intermediate goods produced. If
the degree of increasing returns is su¢ ciently high the real wage will increase as well as consump-
tion. The negative wealth e⁄ect of increased taxation on households is more than o⁄set by the
increase in factor productivity due to the entry of new ￿rms. Rotemberg and Woodford (1992)
consider a model in which ￿rms in each industry collude on the pricing path and deviators are
punished if they follow a di⁄erent path. Since demand increases if there is an increase in govern-
ment expenditures the relative size of the punishment (the forgone future pro￿ts) decreases. As
a result each ￿rm in each oligopolistic industry charges a lower price, the mark-ups decrease and
the real wage and hours increase. Gali, Lopez-Salido and Valles (2004) modify substantially the
1Rotemberg and Woodford (1992) treat innovations in military spending in an autoregressive model as the
exogenous shock that are uncorrelated with any other shocks. They obtain that the responses of output, hours
and real wage to a military spending shock is positive.
2RBC model by including imperfect competition, price-setting and wage-setting frictions, lump-
sum taxation, investment adjustment costs and also non-Ricardian rule-of-thumb consumers,
which are consumers that consume all their available disposable income in each period, to ob-
tain the result that under de￿cit ￿nancing, consumption does rise in the wake of a spending
shock.
Rather than using a complex model, full of frictions, what we propose in this paper is a
simple RBC model without capital but with three added features. First, we give money a
role in transactions by introducing a cash-in-advance constraint for households, as in Lucas
and Stockey (1987). Second, monetary policy has a liquidity e⁄ect like in Fuerst (1992) and
Lucas (1990). Third, we assume that the monetary authority reacts to government spending
innovations. The ￿rst modi￿cation places the interest rate in the consumption-leisure margin.
The second assumption as to do with the way the central bank conducts policy. It is assumed
that policy is conducted by changing the money supply which changes the interest rate due to
the fact that the agents choose their portfolio of assets in advance. The third assumption allows,
whenever there is a government expenditure shock, for the consumption-leisure margin to be
a⁄ected directly through changes in the interest rate.
The most recent literature considers that money is just a unit of account, see Woodford
(2003). In this literature, monetary policy is conducted with the interest rate and it a⁄ects the
economy because there is a friction in the economy that alters the path of the real interest rate
and thus a⁄ects the intertemporal choices of consumption and leisure. Instead we consider that
the interest rate enters in the intra marginal rate of substitution between leisure and consumption
which gives the monetary policy additional power to in￿ uence the economy.
Naturally, the sign of the response of consumption to the spending shock will necessarily
depend on the direction of the reaction of the monetary authority. By itself the government
spending shock will have a negative wealth e⁄ect which will drive down both consumption and
leisure. What can monetary policy achieve in this setup? If mechanically we set monetary
policy to be expansionary after a government spending shock, then one could in principle get
an expansion in consumption. But this expansion will be due entirely to the monetary easing
rather than ￿scal policy.
It has been thought that there cannot be a positive response in consumption as long as
monetary policy is conducted in a reasonable manner. The common wisdom has been that the
reasonable monetary policy will amplify the consumption response, as the government shock will
create in￿ ationary pressures and the anti-in￿ ationay central bank will increase the interest rate in
order to control in￿ ation expectations and in that way it will decrease further the consumption.
To obtain the reverse result, i.e. that the sign of the monetary policy is of opposite sign and
overcompensates the e⁄ect of the expenditure shock it will require that the monetary policy be
speci￿ed so that the central bank will react by increasing the money supply. In doing that the
central bank would be due to the rigidity in the adjustment of portfolios, varying the path of
3the interest rates, decreasing them in the short-run and increasing them in the long run.
Since we do not have any a priori or any hard evidence on how the central bank reacts to
a government shock, we take this matter to the data by conducting our own empirical analysis
in a structural VAR framework. As it turns out, we estimate that a government expenditure
shock triggers an accommodating reaction by the monetary authorities by which the real money
supply rises and the nominal interest rate decreases. In the context of our model, that a⁄ects
the consumption-leisure margin in such a way that an increase in consumption and a decrease
in leisure of private individuals is possible. As a consequence output raises also.
The rest of the paper is organized as follows. Section 2 presents the empirical evidence and
Section 3 presents the model. Section 4 concludes.
2 Empirical Evidence
In this section we describe in detail our empirical analysis. We do a VAR and use the more
traditional identi￿cation procedure, the one that takes government expenditure as predetermined
relative the other variables in the VAR. In doing so, we use a longer sample than do any of
the contributions that employed the same identi￿cation methodology mentioned above, which
imparts added robustness to the results. Moreover, we include money and the interest rate in
order to test empirically the predictions of our model.
2.1 Identi￿cation of the Government Expenditure Shock
In the context of structural VARs, Blanchard and Perotti (2002) developed a methodology to
identify fundamental government spending shocks as well as their dynamic e⁄ects on a set of
macroeconomic variables. Their identi￿cation strategy bears on the insight that the institutional
framework that lies behind ￿scal policy decisions is such so to render public spending essentially
exogenous. In practice, this means assuming that government expenditure is predetermined with
respect to the other variables in their VAR. For our purposes, we follow the strategy of Blanchard
and Perotti (2002) with an added twist needed to make our identi￿cation strategy consistent
with the feature of the model of section 3 by which the central bank reacts to innovations
in government spending by changing the money supply. So, apart from assuming that the
government expenditure is predetermined relative to all the other variables in our VAR, we also
impose the supplementary identifying restriction that money supply reacts contemporaneously
only to shocks to itself and to government spending. The reason for imposing that the money
supply reacts contemporaneously only to government spending is to ensure that the response,
on impact, of money to a government expenditure shock is being driven by that shock directly
and not indirectly through the dynamic response of the remaining variables in the VAR. As
it will become apparent below, this identi￿cation strategy amounts to using a Choleski-type
decomposition with a couple of ordering restrictions.
4The analysis is based on the following reduced-form VAR,
Yt = ￿ + B (L)Yt￿1 + ut, Eutu
0
t = V (1)
where Yt ￿ [Gt;M1t;GDPt;Ct;Tt;Pt;Rt;Wt] is the vector of the endogenous variables com-
prising the following variables: real government spending, real money supply, real GDP, real
private consumption, real net taxes, GDP de￿ ator, nominal interest rate and real wage. B(L)
is a polynomial of order q in the lag operator, L, and ut is the vector of the one-step-ahead
forecast errors to Yt with invariant variance matrix V .
The VAR can alternatively be represented by the structural form:
A0Yt = A(L)Yt￿1 + et: (2)
where the structural shocks, et, which are unobservable, are assumed to be mutually independent
and related linearly to the one-step-ahead forecast errors, ut:
ut = Cet; Eete
0
t = I:
The parameters of the structural form are therefore linked to those of the reduced form by:
C = A￿1
0 ;B (L) = A￿1
0 A(L) (3)
where the ￿rst column of C is the object we need to uniquely identify in order to compute the








Let, for notational convenience, the vector of the VAR variables be re-written as:
Yt ￿ [Gt;M1t;Xt] (5)
where Xt includes all variables apart from government spending and the money supply. In this
context, our identi￿cation strategy imposes not only that condition (4) be satis￿ed but also the













































where A0 is partitioned conformably with Yt in (5). The ￿rst row of A0 re￿ ects the assumption
that government spending is predetermined with respective to all other variables in the VAR.
5The second row re￿ ects the assumption that the money supply is predetermined with respect to
all other variables but government spending. The absence of restrictions on the elements of the
third row is just re￿ ecting that we are not imposing any structure on the coe¢ cients of the last
six equations of our VAR. This means that the elements of the third row in (6) are not identi￿ed.
That, however, does not constitute a problem for our purposes because the block-recursiveness
implied by our identi￿cation strategy is enough to uniquely pin down the dynamic responses of
all the variables to a government expenditure shock.2
It can be shown without any loss of generality that, ￿rst, the dynamic responses of the
variables in Yt are uniquely identi￿ed if one adopts the normalization that A0 is lower-triangular
with positive diagonal elements and, second, that adopting that normalization, the dynamic
responses are invariant to an arbitrary change in the ordering of the variables in Xt
3. This implies
that we can uniquely identify the impulse responses pertaining to a government expenditure
shocks by setting A0 equal to the inverse of the Choleski factor of the V matrix4, without
worrying about the order in which the variables in Xt appear in the reduced-form VAR.
2.2 Data Description
The statistical series used to measure the variables in our VAR come in quarterly frequency,
and cover the period 1948:I-2004:III, which is the longest available sample for the United States.
We took the same de￿nitions of government expenditure and revenue as Blanchard and Perotti
(2002). For government spending (G) we took the item real government consumption expen-
ditures and gross investment from the National Income and Product Accounts (NIPA) tables
of the Bureau of Economic Analysis (BEA). The measure for nominal net taxes is de￿ned as
current government receipts less current transfer payments and interest payments. Net taxes
measured in real terms were obtained by dividing the nominal net taxes measure by the GDP
de￿ ator. The real GDP (Y ) and GDP de￿ ator (P) series were extracted from the NIPA tables,
BEA. The consumption variable (C), was taken from the item real personal consumption expen-
ditures of the NIPA tables, BEA. The series for nominal money supply (M1) was taken from the
FRED database of the Federal Reserve Bank of St. Louis in monthly frequency and transformed
into quarterly series by simple averaging. The variable R was proxied by the secondary market
2The results do not change much if M1t and Rt interchange positions, i.e. if instead of having M1t as the
second element of Yt we have Rt as the second element of Yt and M1t as one more variable in Xt: Moreover, the
results are robust to throwing out one of the two monetary variables from Yt. That is if we take out Rt from the
Xt or if we do not consider M1t in the regression and instead consider Rt as the second element of Yt the main
results still hold.
3Although the identi￿cation strategy pursued in this paper di⁄ers from the one discussed in Christiano, Eichen-
baum and Evans (1999), the proof of the statements in this paragraph is analogous to the one presented in
Christiano, Eichenbaum and Evans (1999) section 4.1. We, therefore, omit the proof to conserve on space.
4Notice that, since the Choleski factor of V is unique, this particular choice of A0 corresponds to the unique
lower-triangular matrix that satis￿es our identi￿cation assumptions summarized in (4) and (6).
6yield of the three-month Treasury Bill as published by the Board of Governors of the Federal
Reserve System. This series was transformed from monthly frequency into quarterly frequency
through simple averaging. The real wage variable (W) was computed by dividing the nominal
hourly compensation of the non-farm business sector published by the Bureau of Labor Statistics
(BLS), by the GDP de￿ ator. All variables, except R are expressed in log levels and seasonally
adjusted. For R we have used the level. All quantity variables were normalized by the size of
the working age population as measured by the series P16 published by the BLS.
2.3 Impulse Responses
Our VAR analysis is conducted for the period 1949:I-2004:III, since we have to drop the ￿rst four
observations to account for the fact that we set the VAR lag-length to four (q = 4). The plots of
the impulse response to a government expenditure shock, measured in percentage deviations5,
are displayed in ￿gure 1. The dashed lines correspond to 95% con￿dence bands constructed
using standard error estimates of impulse responses obtained from 2,000 bootstrap simulations.
The shock induces a signi￿cant and protracted rise in both government spending and real GDP.
The government spending multiplier on real GDP was estimated to be of 0.7 and 1.5 after one
and two years, respectively6, which are in line with Blanchard and Perotti (2002) and Gali et al
(2004). The results of ￿gure 1 are compatible with the monetary authority accommodating the
government expenditure shock by raising the money supply and decreasing the nominal interest
rate. This combined with the result, also obtained in the literature, that private consumption
does not drop with the spending shock, is consistent with the results of our model by which the
fall in the interest rate that follows the spending shocks enacts a change in the consumption
margin that causes the consumption to rise. The response of prices to a government spending
shock is negative. This result is found in many other papers, for instance Edelberg, Eichenbaum
and Fisher (1999), FatÆs and Mihov (2001) and Mountford and Uhlig (2002).
3 The Model
Here we present a simple model economy, similar in structure to Christiano, Eichenbaum and
Evans (1995), that is able to replicate the main features of the data. The economy consists of
a representative household, a representative ￿rm, a representative ￿nancial intermediary and a
government. We consider shocks to government consumption and money supply. The set of all
possible shocks in period t is denoted by St, the history of these shocks up to period t, which
we call state at t, (s0;s1;:::;st), is denoted by st, and the set of all possible states in period t is
denoted by St. The initial realization s0 is given. To simplify the exposition, we assume that
5Except for R, which is measured in changes in basis points.
6In these calculations we used the sample mean of the share of G in Y , which is around 24%.
7the history of shocks has a discrete distribution. Given history st￿1; the number of all possible
shocks in period t is #
￿
Stjst￿1￿
and the number of all possible states in period t is #St.
3.1 Government:
The government gets revenues from lump-sum taxes Tt, makes government expenditures expen-
ditures gt and supplies money Ms
t . Government expenditures are a purely random variable.
Since there are lump-sum taxes government debt plays no role. Taxes are an endogenous vari-
able. The central bank makes a lump-sum monetary transfer Xt to the representative ￿nancial
intermediary at each date t = 0;1;2;:::. The money supply evolves according to Ms
t = Ms
t￿1+Xt.
The central bank increases the money supply whenever there is a positive government shock.
3.2 Financial Intermediary:
The ￿nancial intermediary receives deposits Lt from the households and lends them out to the
￿rm. The gross nominal interest rate on the deposits and on the loans to the ￿rm is Rt. The
￿nancial intermediary receives from the monetary authority the transfer of money Xt, that is
also lent out to the ￿rms.
3.3 Household







where ￿ is a discount factor, Ct is consumption and 1 ￿ Nt is leisure.
The good market is open at the beginning of each period and the asset market at the end of
each period. At the end of period t ￿ 1 the household has wealth Wt￿1, part of it he decides to
maintain as cash to carry out transactions in period t and the remaining he decides to deposit
at the intermediary. The household starts period t with outstanding money balances, Mh
t , and
outstanding deposits at the ￿nancial intermediary, Lt. Thus,
Lt + Mh
t ￿ Wt￿1 (7)
The household receives the labor income, WtNt, where Wt is the wage rate and where Nt is
hours of work. The wage is paid in advance and can be used to purchase consumption in the
same period. The purchases of consumption goods are such that,
PtCt ￿ Mh
t + WtNt: (8)
At the end of the period, the households receive the gross returns on the loans RtLt and pay
taxes Tt. Thus the cash holdings for the household at period t are
8Wt = Mh
t + WtNt ￿ PtCt ￿ Tt + RtLt: (9)
Taking together (7) and (9) get
Lt+1 + Mh
t+1 = Mh
t + WtNt ￿ PtCt ￿ Tt + RtLt: (10)
Let the state variables be Mh
t and Lt and let V be the value function of the household. The
household￿ s problem can be written as follows:
V (Mh











t+1 + Lt+1 ￿ Mh
t ￿ PtCt ￿ Tt + WtNt + RtLt;
and Mh
0 and L0 as given













The ￿rst condition is the intratemporal condition in expected value, since the household must
decide his portfolio in advance. The second condition is the intertemporal condition between
two time consecutive leisure levels.
3.4 Firm
The problem of the ￿rm is to choose the price in order to maximize pro￿ts that can be used for






￿t = Ptyt ￿ Wtnt ￿ (Rt ￿ 1)M
f
t
subject to the technology
yt ￿ Atnt;




9Since the technology and cash-in-advance restrictions will be both satis￿ed with equality,
the pro￿ts can be written as










The clearing conditions for the deposits, good, labor and money markets are:
Lt + Xt = M
f
t = Wtnt





























Ct = AtNt ￿ gt (15)
PtCt = Mh
t + WtNt (16)
Xt + Lt = WtNt (17)
Mh
t + Lt = MS
t￿1 (18)
Next we show how the monetary instruments can be chosen in order to get a unique equilibrium.
We assume that all variables determined at t￿1 are given, and study how to choose the money
supply and interest rate so that all variables that are decided at date t become determined




money injections, Xt and #
￿
Stjst￿1￿
￿ 1 interest rates, Rt. Under







values for Wt, #
￿
Stjst￿1￿
values for Ct, #
￿
Stjst￿1￿
values for Nt; one Rt; one Mh
t
and one Lt. For a given st￿1; the number of equations (12)-(18) is exactly equal to the number
of unknowns. Thus, we get uniqueness of the equilibrium if the central bank sets its policy in
the manner just described.
4 The government shock
Here we assume that the economy is in its deterministic steady state when it receives a positive
permanent government shock in period T and the central bank responds by decreasing the
interest rate, through an increase in the money supply. We simplify the exposition by taking












= 1 for t < T and
t > T + 1:
The economy before the shock in period T is in its deterministic steady state and as it takes
only one period to adjust, in period T + 1 the economy goes to the new steady state. The




































It can be seen from the last two equations that if the value for ￿ is su¢ ciently small then NT
will increase more than the government expenditures and consumption will increase in period
T:
Now we verify that the decrease in the interest rate can only be attained through a increase





















































increases then the ratio
Mh
T
XT+LT goes down. Thus, XT must
go up since Mh
T and LT were chosen in advance.
5 Final Remarks
Past researchers have obtained evidence that indicate that a government expenditure shock
raises output and does not decrease consumption. This evidence is di¢ cult to reconcile with the
RBC model. In the standard RBC model a positive government expenditure, no matter how
it is ￿nanced, leads to smaller consumption. The literature as proceeded by complicating the
RBC model in such a way that it can satisfy the evidence. Instead of building a model with
a large number of frictions that can deliver this result we follow a di⁄erent and simpler route.
We study if the central bank reacts to the government expenditure in such way that its e⁄ect
over the consumption is opposite and dominates the initial e⁄ect of the government expenditure
shock.
We do a VAR with alternative variables and equations for a long time span that con￿rms
that a government expenditure shock raises output and consumption but also that the central
bank reacts to the government consumption shock by increasing money supply and decreasing
the interest rate. A standard RBC model with portfolios chosen in advance is used to argue
that this type of reaction by the central bank can explain the behavior of consumption after a
government expenditure shock. We do not discuss or o⁄er an explanation of why the central
bank reacts in this way to the government expenditure shock. The reaction of the central bank
is taken as exogenous, like if it was a monetary rule. We do not know why the central bank may
react in this way, but we think it is an important topic that deserves more research.
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